INTRODUCTION
In this paper we deal with manipulation and implementation of solu-Ž . tions in the context of marriage problems Gale and Shapley, 1962 . There are two disjoint sets of agents, say the set of men and the set of women. Each man has a preference relation over the set of women and staying single, and each woman has a preference relation over the set of men and staying single. An allocation is a matching of men and women. A matching Ž is stable if no agent ends up worse than remaining single i.e., if it is . indi¨idually rational , and no man᎐woman pair prefer each other to their mates. The stability criterion has been central to the studies of marriage problems and to the analysis of two-sided matching problems in general. Alcalde 1996 , Ma 1994 , 1995 , and Shin and Suh 1996 characterized the ''equilibria'' of the preference re¨elation games induced by stable solutions to marriage problems. 2 It turns out that when the chosen Ž equilibrium concept considers only unilateral deviations i.e., when the . Nash equilibrium is employed the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides Ž . with the set of indi¨idually rational matchings Alcalde, 1996 ; when it considers both unilateral deviations as well as deviation by pairs, the set of Ž equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of stable matchings Ma, . 1995 ; and when it considers deviations by all coalitions, the set of Ž equilibrium outcomes coincides with the core Ma, 1994, Shin and Suh, . 1996 . In this paper we unify these results and relate them to the early Ž . work of Kalai et al. 1979 . Ž In many situations agents in particular coalitions henceforth referred to . as permissible coalitions can coordinate their actions, whereas agents in other coalitions cannot. This observation motivates the following refine-Ž . ment of the Nash equilibrium due to Kalai et al. 1979 : Let G G be a set of permissible coalitions. A strategy profile is a G G-proof Nash equilibrium if it is immune to joint deviations of agents in any permissible coalition. Similarly, they define the G G-core to be the set of allocations such that no permissible coalition can improve the welfare of all its members by reallocation of its resources. We adopt this setup and characterize the set of G G-proof Nash equilibrium outcomes of the preference re¨elation games induced by Pareto efficient and indi¨idually rational solutions. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the G G-core. 3 The results of Alcalde 1996 , Ma 1994 , 1995 , and Shin and Suh 1996 Thomson 1984 Thomson , 1988 characterized the equilibria of the preference revelation games induced by monotonic solutions and the Shapley¨alue respectively in l-good, n-person economies. it is not blocked by any agent or any man᎐woman pair under R. We Ž . denote the set of stable matchings under R by S S R . A matching is Pareto efficient under R if there is no matching Ј such that we have
Ž . denote the set of Pareto efficient matchings under R by P P R .
A matching rule is a function :
A matching correspondence is a mapping : R R « M M. Some examples of matching correspondences are the indi¨idually rational correspondence that selects the set of indi¨idually rational matchings and the stable correspondence that selects the set of stable matchings for each problem.
MANIPULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
In many real life markets agents are asked to report their preferences and a particular matching rule is used to match them. Technically speaking, they are confronted with a game where their strategy space is a class of possible preferences and the outcome is determined by the chosen matching rule. It is very natural to study the equilibria of such games where one can consider several equilibrium notions. This problem is Ž . already studied by Alcalde 1996 who considers the Nash equilibrium, Ma Ž . Ž . 1994 , and Shin and Suh 1996 who consider the strong Nash equilibrium, Ž . and Ma 1995 who considers the rematching-proof equilibrium as their underlying equilibrium concepts. They characterize the equilibria of the games induced by stable matching rules.
We extend these papers in two directions. First, we do not restrict ourselves to any of these equilibrium notions. In situations where agents cannot coordinate their strategies the natural equilibrium notion is the Nash equilibrium. In situations where all agents can coordinate their strategies, the natural equilibrium notion is the strong Nash equilibrium. In most real life applications, however, agents in some groups can coordinate their actions while agents in others cannot. Hence, following Kalai et al. Ž . 1979 , we consider a class of equilibrium notions where the two polar cases are the Nash equilibrium and the strong Nash equilibrium. The second direction of extension is that we employ a wider class of matching rules, namely the class of Pareto efficient and indi¨idually rational matching rules.
We need to introduce more notation and definitions to present our
Here G G is the set of coalitions within which Ä 4 all agents can coordinate their actions. We assume that i g G G for all
_ л , this definition reduces to core; Ä < < 4 when G G s G ; M j W : G s 1 it reduces to indi¨idual rationality; and
to stability. We denote the matching correspondence that selects the G G-core allocations for each problem by C C G G .
i's strategy space and f : S ª M M is an outcome function. Note that the pair Ž . ⌫, R defines a game. In this paper we restrict our attention to a very natural class of mechanisms where S s R R for all i g M j W. Under this i i restriction any outcome function is a matching rule. Such mechanisms are often referred to as direct mechanisms and the resulting games are often referred to as preference re¨elation games. Next we define a class of Nash equilibrium refinements. For all G g G G, for all s g S, let s be the strategy tuple that is obtained from s by yG removing s for all i g G and let S s Ł S . A strategy-tuple s g S is
Ž . a G G -proof Nash equilibrium of the game S, f, R if for all G g G G, and for
G s 1 this definition reduces to the Nash M j W Ä 4 equilibrium and when G G s 2 _ л it reduces to the strong Nash equilibrium. 4 We denote the set of G G-proof Nash equilibria of the game
S,f,R by N S, f, R and the set of all equilibrium outcomes by
Now we are ready to present our main result:
THEOREM. For any Pareto efficient and indi¨idually rational matching Ž . rule the direct mechanism ⌫ s R R, implements the G G-core in G G-proof Nash equilibria.
Proof. Let : R R ª M M be Pareto efficient and indi¨idually rational. Let R g R R. We prove the theorem via two claims.
Under RЈ all men rank their mates under at the top of their preferences and rank any other woman worse than staying single. The same holds for all women. This together with the preferences being strict imply that Ž . Ž . Ä 4 Ž . Ž . Ž . P P RЈ lI I RЈ s . But we have RЈ g P P RЈ l I I RЈ and there-Ž .
all i g G. We need to consider two cases.
Then we have f C C R leading to the contradiction we are looking for.
Ž . Without loss of generality suppose i g M. Note that i P i R i and
Ž . that i / i and therefore w / w . Moreover, w s i / w, leading to the contradiction we are looking for. 4 
Ž
. A strategy-tuple s g S is a strong Nash equilibrium of the game S, f, R if for all Suh 1996 identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution to be implementable in G G-proof Nash equilibria.
Ž . Hence we have RЈ g N R R, , R . This, together with RЈ s , completes the proof of Claim 1.
Hence g C C R , completing the proof of Claim 2.
Q.E.D.
We obtain the results of Alcalde 1996 , Ma 1994 , 1995 , and Shin and Ž . Suh 1996 as corollaries to our theorem.
. 6 C OROLLARY 1 Alcalde, 1996 . For any stable matching rule the direct Ž . mechanism ⌫ s R R, implements the indi¨idually rational correspondence in Nash equilibria.
Then the G G-core is equal to the set of indi¨idually rational matchings, and the notion of the G G-proof Nash equilibrium reduces to the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, any matching rule that is stable is both Pareto efficient and indi¨idually rational. These observations together with the theorem complete the proof.
Q.E.D. 2 Ma, 1994; Shin and Shu, 1996 . For any stable matching Ž . rule the direct mechanism ⌫ s R R, implements the stable correspondence in strong Nash equilibria.
Then the G G-core is equal to the core, and the notion of the G G-proof Nash equilibrium reduces to the strong Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the core is equal to the set of stable matchings Ž . Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem 3.3 , and any matching rule that is stable is both Pareto efficient and indi¨idually rational. These observations together with the theorem complete the proof.
6
Ž . See also Roth 1985 . 7 Ž . See Kara and Sonmez 1996 for an analysis of matching rules that are Nash imple-Ž . mentable not necessarily via direct mechanisms in the context of marriage problems.
Ž . Ma 1995 introduces the following equilibrium notion: A preference profile is a rematching-proof equilibrium of a preference revelation game if it is a Nash equilibrium and it also is immune to joint deviations by any man᎐woman pair.
Ž
. C OROLLARY 3 Ma, 1995 . For any stable matching rule the direct Ž . mechanism ⌫ s R R, implements the stable correspondence in rematchingproof equilibria.
Then the G G-core is equal to the set of stable matchings, and the notion of the G G-proof Nash equilibrium reduces to the rematching-proof equilibrium. Moreover, any matching rule that is stable is both Pareto efficient and indi¨idually rational. These observations together with the theorem complete the proof.
